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Malthusian  conditions  are  a  byword  for 
stagnation. We argue that this view is wrong. 
Europe’s relative riches in 1700 are best under-
stood as the result of Malthusian forces favor-
ing high per capita output. Favorable shifts in 
mortality and fertility schedules were respon-
sible.  Incomes  between  1300  and  1800  rose 
because  of  two  related  but  distinct  European 
“inventions”—a peculiar marriage pattern and a 
specific mortality regime. These interacted with 
the political, social, and economic environment 
in such a way as to make higher equilibrium 
incomes sustainable.
Even in a simple Malthusian world, incomes 
can change, but only in the short run. They did 
so  markedly  after  the  Black  Death.  As  land-
labor ratios rose in an economy subject to strong 
declining  marginal  returns,  workers  became 
more  productive.  Income  after  1350  rose— 
perhaps by as much as a factor of three (Henry 
Phelps-Brown  and  Sheila  V.  Hopkins  1981; 
Gregory  Clark  2005).  In  a  Malthusian  world 
where land-labor ratios are a prime determinant 
of  income  levels,  such  riches should  not  last. 
Birth rates increase; death rates fall. Population 
rises in response to the windfall. Eventually, the 
economy  returns  to  the  previous  equilibrium, 
with identical wages and population size.
1
1 Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor (2008) provide cross-
sectional  evidence  for  the  predictions  of  the  Malthusian 
model.  They  show  that  population  density  until  1500 
depends positively on soil fertility and on a proxy for agri-
cultural productivity (years since the Neolithic transition), 
while per capita income is independent of these indicators.
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The logic of the Malthusian world leads Clark 
(2007)  to  conclude  that  Englishmen  in  1800 
were as poor as their ancestors on the African 
savannah.  Yet,  Europe  in  the  early  modern 
period  was  unusually  rich,  despite  abundant 
evidence that hard times could drive up death 
rates  (Malthus’s  “positive  check”)  and  reduce 
birth rates.
2 The emergence of such differences 
in income should be puzzling in a world where 
Malthusian forces are strong, and technological 
progress as well as institutional improvements 
were slow. Western Europe in 1700 already was 
at least twice as urbanized as any other part of the 
globe. Incomes probably towered over those in 
other areas, recent arguments by the “California 
School” that emphasizes the productivity of the 
Yangtze area not withstanding.
3
This  paper  argues  that  Malthusian  regimes 
are capable of sustained changes in per capita 
incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility sched-
ules can lead to different steady-state income 
levels, with long periods of growth during the 
transition.
4 Europe checked the downward pres-
sure  on  wages  through  late  marriage,  which 
reduced  fertility,  and  a  mortality  regime  that 
combined high death rates with high incomes. 
We argue that both emerged as a result of the 
Black Death.
I.  Malthusian Basics
The economy produces a homogenous good—
food—using a Cobb-Douglas   technology with 
labor  (L)  and  land  (T )  as  inputs.  Per  capita 
income is given by
2 This may also have facilitated the transition to self-
sustaining growth after 1800, as we argue in Voigtländer 
and Voth (2006)
3  Kenneth  Pomeranz  (2000);  Jack  Goldstone  (2003). 
Recent work by Stephen N. Broadberry and Bishnupriya 
Gupta (2005) suggests that income differences remained 
substantial.
4 This argument is also explored in Joel Mokyr and Voth 
(2009).
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(1)    y = A a  T  __  L   b  
α
  ,
where α is the land share of income. Land is in 
fixed supply. In the short run, per capita income 
grows in total factor productivity (TFP) (A) and 
decreases in population. Population growth γL, 
in turn, responds to nutrition, and is given by 
the difference between birth rates (b) and death 
rates (d ). This relationship is captured by
(2)    γL = b − d = b0(y/  _  y    )  
φb   − d0(  y/  _  y    )  
φd  ,
where    _  y    denotes  “subsistence”  income,
5  and 
b0 (d0) is the birth (death) rate at   _  y  . We choose 
b0 = d0 = 3 percent. This corresponds to a life 
expectancy of 33 years. Next, we use φb ≃ 1.4 
and φd ≃ −0.5 as the elasticities of birth and 
death rates with respect to income, respectively.
6 
Therefore, higher income translates into more 
births and lower mortality. This relationship is 
shown by the solid curves in Figure 1.
In the short run, population L is given, and 
(1) determines per capita income. In the long-
run, however, the population dynamics given in 
(2) pin down the land-labor ratio, which in turn 
affects y. In the absence of technological prog-
ress, death rates equal birth rates, and L is con-
stant. The same holds for per capita income. The 
level at which y stagnates depends on the loca-
tion of the fertility and mortality schedules, as 
represented by point E0 in Figure 1. A one-time 
increase in TFP temporarily relieves Malthusian 
constraints;  population  can  grow.  Eventually, 
the falling land-labor ratio drives wages back 
to their original level. Per capita income is thus 
self-equilibrating.
Despite the power of self-equilibrating forces, 
stagnation at subsistence is not inevitable. In the 
following,  we  analyze  three  mechanisms  that 
can change the long-run income level.
II.  A European Mortality Pattern
War  was  the  favorite  game  of  princes.  It 
was practiced avidly in early modern Europe. 
5 Initially, incomes stagnate at this level. Note, however, 
that complete starvation need not follow if incomes fall 
below   _  y  . Rather, death rates exceed birth rates, and popula-
tion slowly falls.
6 Values for φb and φd are from Morgan Kelly (2005). 
We discuss the choice of parameters in Voigtländer and 
Voth (2008b).
European powers were at war for an average 90 
out of every 100 years between 1500 and 1800 
(Charles Tilly 1992). How could European pow-
ers come to fight each other so frequently? In 
Voigtländer and Voth (2008b), we argue that the 
great plague of the fourteenth century is indi-
rectly responsible.
As  incomes  increased  beyond  subsistence 
levels,  Europeans  everywhere  began  to  buy 
more  than  just  food.  Many  income-elastic 
goods were produced in towns, such as cloth, 
tableware,  cutlery,  and  shoes.  Market  trans-
actions were necessary to obtain the cash for 
these  purchases—monetization  increased. 
Importantly, towns offered access to the liq-
uid wealth that princes needed to fund their 
wars. Residents of cities were also more eas-
ily  taxed  than  peasants  in  the  countryside, 
whose contributions were principally in kind. 
War, therefore, was a luxury good for rulers 
in early modern Europe, and one whose avail-
ability depended more on the per capita income 
of citizens than on absolute output. In a highly 
fragmented political environment, the surge in 
available funds produced a rapid and sustained 
rise in the frequency and intensity of warfare.
Military technology in early modern Europe 
was  too  primitive  to  wreak  much  havoc 
directly, the horrors of the Thirty Years War 
not withstanding (John Landers 2003). Armed 
conflict was deadly, not because of battlefield 
deaths or direct civilian casualties, but because 
of diseases spread by troops. The plague itself 
was brought to Europe as a result of the siege 
of  Kaffa  in  the  Crimea,  after  the  besieging 
Tartars  used  catapults  to  throw  the  corpses 
of deceased soldiers over the city walls. Until 
the nineteenth century, diseases spread in the 
wake of marching armies were more deadly 
than the fighting itself. Geographical hetero-
geneity  spelled  relative  isolation  for  many 
populations. Even mild diseases such as influ-
enza could turn into a major cause of death in 
remote areas.
Passing armies would often requisition seed 
and livestock, causing peasants to starve. While 
the destruction that followed was negative for 
output in the short run, frequent and early deaths 
were  beneficial  for  the  survivors’  incomes.
7 
7 The negative shock to agricultural output was not long-
lasting since the reproduction rates of livestock are high, MAy 2009 250 AEA PAPERs AND PROCEEDiNGs
Higher  post-plague  incomes  yielded  a  greater 
extractable  surplus.  This  was  partly  used  by 
European kings to fight each other. The upward 
shift in death rates was reinforced by two aux-
iliary factors—diseases spread via trade routes, 
and the unhygienic conditions in early modern 
European cities.
After 1348–1349, the plague broke out again 
and again in Europe, before vanishing in the 
eighteenth century. Epidemics of other diseases, 
such as typhus and smallpox, were also com-
mon. Where they were not spread by troops on 
the  march,  they  often  arrived  in  the  bottoms 
of merchant ships or on the wagons of traders. 
The  last  plague  outbreak  in  Western  Europe, 
in  Marseille  in  1720,  was  due  to  a  merchant 
vessel bringing silk and other goods from the 
Levant. Trade increased as a result of the higher 
incomes  after  the  Black  Death.  These  higher 
incomes went hand-in-hand with higher death 
rates, thus producing a self-reinforcing effect in 
a Malthusian setting.
European cities were famously unhealthy. Be- 
fore 1850, most of them would have   disappeared 
and because land left fallow will be more productive once it 
is brought under the plough.
had it not been for continuous   in-migration. Life 
expectancy in London, 1580–1799, was short 
(27 years, compared to 35–38 years in Britain 
as a whole).
8 In part, cultural practices were to 
blame. While Europeans dumped their cham-
ber-pots out of the window, Chinese cities fer-
ried human excrement to the countryside, where 
it was used as fertilizer. Higher incomes meant 
that more meat was consumed in Europe. The 
proximity of animals such as chickens and pigs 
spread disease (Jared Diamond 1997). Finally, 
due to frequent warfare, many European cit-
ies were surrounded by massive fortifications. 
As population size increased, densities had to 
rise—expansion outside the city walls was dan-
gerous, and moving Italian-style fortifications 
much too costly. High densities, polluted water 
sources, and unhygienic cultural practices con-
spired to raise death rates in European cities. 
As per capita incomes and agricultural produc-
tivity increased after 1349, urbanization rates 
went up. This itself raised death rates in the 
aggregate.
In combination, war, trade, and city mortal-
ity raised European mortality substantially. As 
8 Landers (1993); E. Anthony Wrigley et al. (1997).
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Malthus  (1826)  famously  observed,  “war  and 
contention,”  “unwholesome  trades  and  manu-
factories,” and “great and pestilent cities” with 
a “prejudicial effect on the human constitution” 
can act as important brakes on population pres-
sure. In Voigtländer and Voth (2008b), we show 
that  these  three  factors  raise  aggregate  death 
rates by more than 1 percent (in addition to the 
3 percent background mortality). All of these 
factors were directly or indirectly related to ris-
ing incomes—as a source of financing for war, 
or as a cause for demand for trade and urban 
products. In turn, they facilitated the perpetua-
tion of higher incomes, by relieving downward 
pressure  on  the  land-labor  ratio.  Because  the 
death schedule in early modern Europe shifted 
outward, incomes could be permanently higher 
than they had been before the Black Death. This 
is shown as an upward shift of the death sched-
ule in Figure 1 from d to d′. The correspond-
ing equilibrium is E1
d, which combines higher 
per capita income levels with lower population. 
Under plausible assumptions, this effect alone 
raises per capita income by up to 20 percent, 
thus contributing importantly to the precocious 
rise in European per capita output.
III.  The European Marriage Pattern
Fertility  restriction  was  not  uncommon  in 
pre-modern  societies.  Chinese  families  used 
infanticide, and had low rates of marital fertil-
ity. However, west of a line from St. Petersburg 
to  Trieste,  Europeans  practiced  a  unique  and 
peculiar form of fertility limitation (John Hajnal 
1965, 1982). Women did not marry when they 
became fertile, but markedly later—age at first 
marriage could be as late as 25 or 28. Also, a 
high percentage (up to 15 percent) never mar-
ried.  Once  married,  however,  there  was  no 
fertility limitation. Overall, the European mar-
riage pattern (EMP) prevented between a quar-
ter and half of all possible births (Clark 2007). 
Population  pressure  was  thus  reduced.  This 
helped  to  maintain  relatively  high  per  capita 
incomes (Wrigley 1988).
What  caused  Europeans  to  adopt  this  par-
ticular marriage pattern is still unclear. Some 
theories  emphasize  inheritance  rules,  and  the 
North-South divide in fertility within Europe. 
Others  underline  the  role  of  labor  markets 
and  urbanization  in  giving  women  greater 
  bargaining power (Tine de Moor and Jan Luiten 
van Zanden 2005). The system’s origins are hard 
to pin down. Roman Europe had early and near-
universal marriages for women. While there is 
evidence of some women remaining unmarried 
before 1000, EMP found its full expression only 
after 1400 (Hajnal 1965, 1982). Religion can-
not be the answer—Europe was Christian long 
before it became a low-fertility area.
Our  explanation  for  EMP  adoption  focuses 
on what many young women did before getting 
married. The vast majority—especially on the 
lower  rungs  of  society—worked  as  servants, 
either  in  domestic  service  or  in  agriculture. 
Food and lodging were provided free of charge, 
in exchange for labor services. In addition, ser-
vants received a wage in cash. This was mostly 
saved in the hope of finding a better match in 
the  marriage  market.  According  to  estimates 
by Ann Kussmaul (1981), more than half of all 
English women and men age 15 to 24 worked as 
servants during the early modern period—the 
vast majority of them in agriculture. In particu-
lar, women worked as servants in husbandry, 
milking cows, and tending flocks.
The positive shock to incomes after the Black 
Death increased demand for the products of pas-
toral agriculture. While the extent of the rise in 
meat consumption after 1349 is disputed, the 
general switch in agricultural production from 
“corn to horn” (Bruce M. S. Campbell 2000) is 
not. In addition to the higher demands for meat, 
production of wool and consumption of cheese 
and  other  dairy  products  surged.  These  were 
classic “superior goods” of the period. Pastoral 
production on average took place in much larger 
production  units.  Landlords  often  converted 
arable to pastoral production, driving farmers 
off the land. This is why, in 1516, Thomas More 
wrote of “man-eating sheep” in his utopia.
The  rise  in  livestock  production  was  land-
using and labor-saving. In particular, it econo-
mized  on  the  factor  of  production  that  had 
become particularly expensive after 1349—male 
labor. Women could perform many of the tasks 
in animal husbandry. Because of the year-round 
labor requirements in pastoral farming, employ-
ing servants on year-long or multiyear contracts 
was convenient. Servants overwhelmingly lived 
in  the  households  of  large  landowners,  and 
were  obliged  to  remain  unmarried.  Thus,  the 
positive  demand  shock  for  pastoral  products 
after the Black Death laid the foundations for 
the   emergence of EMP (Voigtländer and Voth MAy 2009 252 AEA PAPERs AND PROCEEDiNGs
2008a). For many women, spending an extended 
period  before  marriage  as  servants  became  a 
way of life.
Importantly, the institution also worked as a 
“shock absorber”—in bad times, when wages 
were  low,  accumulating  savings  took  longer. 
Marriages were delayed, and population pres-
sure was reduced. Thus, EMP simultaneously 
reduced  fertility  rates  overall,  and  facilitated 
adjustment to adverse shocks. This is shown by 
a downward shift of the birth schedule from b to 
b′ in Figure 1, leading to the new long-run equi-
librium E1
b.
9 The lower bound estimate—a dif-
ference of 25 percent between b and b′—implies 
a substantial rise in per capita income, exceed-
ing 10 percent.
IV.  Technological Progress
We now turn to an alternative explanation—
technological progress—and show why its role 
in the initial rise of Europe was probably limited. 
Suppose that TFP grows at the rate γA. Following 
(1), this implies γy = γA − αγL, where popula-
tion growth γL is given by (2). Higher steady-
state per capita income goes hand-in-hand with 
faster population growth. In Figure 2, per capita 
income will grow until γA = α(b − d). At this 
point, TFP increases are offset by the growing 
population, and per capita income stagnates in 
the new equilibrium ETfP .
We use the same parameter values as before to 
determine the magnitude of effects. During the 
early modern period, TFP grew at rates between 
0.05 and 0.15 percent per year (Galor 2005).
10 
We assume that technological progress suddenly 
accelerates such that γA increases from zero in 
E0 to 0.1 percent. In this case, the new long-run 
equilibrium  ETfP  involves  population  growth 
γL,TfP = b − d = γA/α = 0.25 percent.
11 The 
corresponding increase in long-run per capita 
income is less than 5 percent.
12
9 Strictly speaking, the EMP involves rotating the birth 
schedule,  as  well  as  a  downward  shift.  Voigtländer  and 
Voth (2008a) show that both effects emerge endogenously 
in response to product and labor market conditions after the 
Black Death.
10 Low TFP growth apparently existed side-by-side with 
numerous important inventions (Mokyr 1990).
11 This assumes a labor share in  agricultural income 
(1 − α) of 0.6.
12 To derive this number, we use a linear approximation 
of (2) around the equilibrium without technological change 
How  fast  would  technology  have  to  grow 
to  explain  rising  incomes  in  early  modern 
Europe?  Based  on  Angus  Maddison’s  (2001) 
figures, we derive a lower bound of per capita 
output increases, focusing only on the period 
1500–1700. Over these two centuries, European 
per capita income increased by 30 percent. If 
this effect were driven solely by technological 
improvements, the rate of population growth in 
1700 would have to be at least 1.7 percent (corre-
sponding to equilibrium E′ TfP in Figure 2).
13 To 
sustain per capita incomes at 30 percent above 
EL, TFP would have to grow at γ′ A = αγ′ L,TfP ≃ 
0.7 percent p.a. Technological progress of this 
magnitude was not observed before the second 
half of the nineteenth century (N. F. R. Crafts 
and C. Knick Harley 1992; Pol Antràs and Voth 
2003). If we assessed the strength of Malthusian 
responses accurately, improvements in the stock 
of  useful  knowledge  and  of  organizational 
capacity were not fast enough to contribute to 
rising incomes significantly.
V.  Conclusion
Europe’s early modern riches were largely a 
gift of the dead, and of the unborn.
14 Europeans 
died  early  and  married  little,  and  late,  given 
how high incomes were relative to the rest of 
the world. We argue that these peculiar features 
evolved in response to a massive, negative shock 
to  population—the  great  plague  of  the  four-
teenth century. It killed between a third and half 
of  all  Europeans;  land-labor  ratios  increased. 
Higher  production  per  head  created  fresh 
demand for the “luxury products” of the day—
mutton and beef, woolen cloth and city goods. 
As incomes surged, agriculture switched from 
“corn to horn,” and cities swelled in size. The 
rise of pastoral production encouraged the emer-
gence of the European marriage   pattern. Women 
came to delay marriage long after first menarche 
because demand for their labor was now strong. 
This kept population pressure in check.
(y0 =   _  y   and γL,0 = 0). This yields γL,TfP = (φb − φd)b0(yTfP 
− y0)/  _  y   = (1.4 + 0.5) × 3 percent × (yTfP/  _  y   − 1) = 0.25 
percent. Rearranging, we obtain yTfP/  _  y   = 1.044.
13  This  follows  from  the  same  argument  as  above, 
which implies γ′ L,TfP = (1.4 + 0.5) × 3 percent × 0.3 = 
1.7 percent. This number is ten times larger than the actual 
increase in European population between 1500 and 1700 
(Maddison 2001). 
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Rapid  gains  in  urbanization  also  increased 
death rates, since European cities were unusually 
unhealthy.  With  city  growth,  trade  increased, 
spreading disease. The same was true of wars, 
which  Europeans  fought  with  singularly  high 
frequency  after  1400.  Greater  expropriable 
surpluses and growing city wealth paid for the 
upsurge in fighting. In combination, urbaniza-
tion, trade, and war produced an upward shift of 
the death schedule. This also reduced downward 
pressure on the land-labor ratio. A combination 
of both fertility and mortality changes in the 
aftermath of the Black Death leads to equilib-
rium E2 in Figure 1. It shows how lower fertil-
ity and higher mortality ensured that European 
wage  rates  did  not  return  to  their  low,  pre-
Plague level. For plausible parameter values, our 
approach can explain a rise of per capita income 
of  30  percent—almost  exactly  the  increase 
observed in Europe, 1500–1700, overall.
Even  in  a  Malthusian  world,  Ricardo’s 
“Iron  Law  of  Wages”  need  not  hold.  While 
  equilibrating Malthusian forces may be strong, 
ensuring that a steady state is reached quickly, 
a wide range of equilibrium wage rates can be 
maintained indefinitely if birth and death rates 
themselves  shift.  We  have  argued  that  major 
shocks, such as the Black Death, produced such 
shifts. In our view, they were instrumental in the 
rise of European incomes far above subsistence 
during  the  early  modern  period—long  before 
technological change became rapid.
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